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In order to explain countercyclical markups, a simple two-period model of industry
dynamics is constructed where output is produced potentially by two firms which are
subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks as well as aggregate productivity shocks.
During booms, both firms with low and high productivity stay in the market and engage in
a Bertrand-type competition to yield marginal-cost pricing, implying zero markups. During
recessions, however, firm with low productivity shock decides to exit, allowing the high-
productivity firm to enjoy positive markups as a monopolist in the output market.
Campbell(1988) documented that, in the U.S., (employment weighted) plant exit in the
manufacturing sector is countercyclical. Also, Solon et al.(1994) and Murphy et al.(1989)
claimed that real factor prices — wages and raw-material prices — are procyclical and more
competitive behavior of firms during economic booms causes markups to fall. As a first step
toward building a framework that can account for these facts altogether, this note constructs a
simple model of industry dynamics over the business cycles which can account for
countercyclical markups.
Specifically, we examine a two-period model with a single output produced potentially by two
firms which are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks as well as aggregate productivity
shocks (booms or recessions). We show that, during booms, both firms with low and high
productivity stay in the market and engage in a Bertrand-type competition to yield marginal-cost
pricing. This implies zero markups in equilibrium. During recessions, however, a firm with low
productivity shock decides to exit, leaving the market to be dominated by the high-productivity
firm. The single firm acts as a monopolist in the market for output and a monopsonist in the
markets for input factors. This yields positive markups in the output market whose magnitude
depends on the price elasticity of output demand and the factor price elasticities of demand for
inputs (i.e., labor and capital).
Alternative explanations for the countercyclical markups are as follows. First, Bils(1989),
Klemperer(1995), Okun(1981), and Stiglitz(1984) claimed that lower elasticities of demand
during recessions lead imperfectly competitive firms to increase markups. Second, Rotemberg
and Saloner(1986) and Rotemberg and Woodford(1991, 1992) attributed the countercyclical
markups to the inability of firms to collude during booms. Finally, capital market imperfections
are the main reason for the countercyclical  markups according to Greenwald et al.(1984),
Gottfries(1991), Klemperer(1995), and Chevalier and Scharfstein(1996). During recessions
when firms have difficulty with external financing, they may try to increase profits by charging
higher prices on their output at the expense of losing market share.
1. Environment
The model economy consists of consumers and firms, both of which exist for two periods.
1.1. Preferences
An agent born at period t consumes c1t in period t (when young) and c2t+1 in period t + 1
(when old), and maximizes lifetime expected utility given by:
(1.1) u (c1t) + βEtu (c2t + 1)
where the utility function u (.) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and β ∈ (0, 1) is the
discount factor. 
Consumers work only in the first period of life, supplying inelastically one unit of labor to the
firms. They consume part of their first-period income and save the rest for their second-period
consumption.
The young in period t saves by investing in physical capital that is used to produce output in
period t + 1 together with the labor supplied by the young generation of period t + 1. 
1.2. Technology
There are two firms started in each period and they differ in the realization of the idiosyncratic
productivity shocks ait ∈ {al, ah} (i = 1, 2), which are assumed to be independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time. We assume that 0 ≤ al < ah.
Firm i produces output Yit in period t using the constant-returns-to-scale technology given by:
(1.2) Yit = ztaitF(Ki, Ni)
where F (.) is the production function net of capital depreciation, and zt ∈ {zg, zb} represents
aggregate productivity shock where zg > zb ≥ 0. Output per worker, yi Yi / Ni, is then given by
the following production function:
yit = ztaitf (kit)
where ki is the capital-labor ratio. 
1.3. Market 
There are markets for capital services, output good, and one-period consumption loans. Each
firm acts competitively or monopolistically in period t, depending on the market structure
emerging from a possible exit of a firm after the realization of the aggregate shock zt as well as
the firm-specific productivity shock ait. If there is no exit, then the two firms engage in the
Bertrand-type competition: each firm maximizes profits, taking the wage rate and the rental rate
on capital as given. If a firm exits following the productivity shocks, then the other firm will act
as a monopolist in the both product and factor markets. 
2. Equilibrium
We now examine the optimization problems of consumers and firms to characterize the
market equilibrium.
2.1. Consumers
An individual consumer born at period t chooses consumption {c1t, c2t + 1} and saving st to
maximize lifetime utility (1.1) subject to 
(2.1)
c1t + st = wt ,
c2t + 1 = (1 + rt + 1) st
where wt is the wage received in period t (when young) and rt + 1 is the interest rate paid on
saving held from period t to t + 1. 
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The first-order condition is
(2.2) u’(c1t) = βEt [u’(c2t + 1)(1 + rt + 1)]
Substituting for c1t and c2t + 1 (from the budget constraints) implies the saving function: 
st = s (wt, rt + 1)
With a separable and concave utility function, saving is an increasing function of wage income
wt. In general, the effect of an increase in the interest rate depends on its substitution and income
effects. Assuming that the substitution effect dominates, an increase in interest rates leads to an
increase in saving. 
2.2. Firms
Following the realizations of both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks at the beginning of
period t, each firm makes an exit decision. Given the aggregate productivity shock zt, firm i with
ait will decide to exit if it is to experience a negative profit by staying in the market: 
Πi ≡ maxKit, Nit
[ztaitF (Kit, Nit) – rtKit – wtNit – C] < 0
where C > 0 is the fixed cost associated with production activity.
For simplicity, we assume that the two realizations of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks,
{al, ah} where ah > al are such that if zt = zg, then Πi ≥ 0 for i = l, h; while if zt = zb, then Πi ≥ 0
for i = h. That is, the low idiosyncratic productivity shock (al) during the “recession” (zb) is
sufficiently bad that a firm experiencing al decides to exit; whereas during the “boom” (zg) both
firms find it in their interests to stay in the market.
2.2.1. Economic boom
In the boom, both firms act competitively taking the output price and input factor prices —
wage and rental rate — as given. That is, they hire labor to the point where the marginal product
of labor is equal to the real wage, and rent capital from consumers to the point where the
marginal product of capital is equal to its rental rate: 
(2.3)
ztait [f(kt) – ktf’(kt)] = wt ,
ztaitf ’(kt) = rt
In order to have a markup interpretation, these can be expressed as:
(2.4)
wt rt––––––––––––––––––– = –––––––––––– = 1 
ztait[f(kt) – ktf ’(kt)] ztait f ’(kt) 
This equates marginal cost of single output with its price, which is normalized to unity. This
essentially implies marginal-cost pricing due to the Bertrand competition, and hence zero
markup.
2.2.2. Economic recession 
In the recession, however, a firm with the high productivity shock acts as a monopolist in the
product market and as a monopsonist in the factor markets, following the exit of the other firm
experiencing the low productivity shock. Now, the market is dominated by a single firm that
sells a single output. Such a monopolistic firm does no longer take the output price, wage, and
rental rate as given. Instead, it chooses the price for its own output, while the capital rental rate
depends on the demand for capital by the monopolist and the wage on its demand for labor. 
Let r(Kt) and w(Nt) denote respectively the capital rental rate as a function of the single firm’s




[ptzbahF(Kt, Nt) – r(Kt)Kt – w(Nt)Nt – C]
where pt is the output price charged by the monopolist. Let kt* and Nt* denote the solutions to this
problem. Then, they satisfy the following first-order conditions: 
(2.5)
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where η(yt*) denotes the price elasticity of output demand, which is always negative since the
demand for output decreases in the price. 
Further, using the price elasticities of demand for labor and capital, these can be rewritten as: 
(2.6)
where ε(Nt*) and ε(kt*) denote respectively the wage and rental-rate elasticities of demand for
labor and capital, which are always negative numbers since the demand for labor and capital
decreases respectively in the wage and rental rate. 
Note that in period t the monopolist’s marginal cost of production (using the single good as
numeraire) is   
Comparing this with (2.6), therefore, we observe that the firm’s markup (ratio of price to
marginal cost) will equal 
(2.7)
That is, the level of the markup depends on the price elasticity of output demand and the factor-
price elasticities of labor demand. Notice that the markup becomes positive (γ > 1) as long as the
output demand is sufficiently inelastic relative to the labor demand so that |η(yt*)|<|ε(Nt*)|.
2.3. Market equilibrium
The goods market equilibrium requires that the demand for goods in each period be equal to
the supply, or equivalently that investment be equal to saving (which is also the market-clearing
condition for the one-period consumption loan market):
(2.8) kt + 1 = s (wt, rt+1)
w N
z a f k k f k
t
b h t t t
( )*
* * *′[ ]
Finally, the factor market equilibrium conditions are given by equations (2.3) in an economic
boom period, whereas in a recession period they are given by equations (2.5).
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